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THE PRIEST - PENITENT PRIVILEGE IN
SOUTH CAROLINA - BACKGROUND
AND DEVELOPMENT
I. EXISTENCE OF THE PRIVILEGE AT COMMON LAW
Unlike confidential communications between an attorney
and his client, the common law did not hold communications,
confidential or otherwise, between clergymen and penitents to
be privileged.1 However, there are expressions by judges in
certain cases which indicate that the judiciary felt an aver-
sion to forcing a clergyman to reveal communications re-
ceived by him as confessions pursuant to the discipline of
the church.
2
There is some doubt as to the existence of such a privilege
prior to the Restoration,3 primarily based upon the trial of
Henry Garnet, Superior of the Jesuits in England, who was
tried, convicted and executed for treason.4 In that trial, the
defendant was questioned as to what he would do if he were
asked to reveal what had been said to him during a confes-
sion. His answer was that he would have to conceal the com-
munication because he was bound to keep the secrets of a
confession. The point was pressed no further in the ques-
tioning and the defendant was not required to disclose any
confessional secrets. This case may be explained as an exeep-
1. Normanshaw v. Normanshaw, 69 L. T. Rep. 468 (n. s.) (1893)
(clergyman did not have the right to withhold a communication from
a court of law); Broad v. Pitt, 3 Car. & P. 518, 172 Eng. Rep. 528
(C. P. 1829) (dictum) (Best, C. M., "The privilege does not apply to
clergymen .... "); Wilson v. Rastall, 4 T. R. 743, 100 Eng. Rep. 1283
(K. B. 1792) (dictum) (Buller, J., in discussing the privilege of com-
munication between attorney-client, said, "The privilege is confined to
the cases of counsel, solicitor, and attorney .... "); Anonymous, Skin.
404, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K. B. 1693) (dictum) (in recognizing the attor-
ney-client privilege, Holt, C. J., said, ". . . otherwise of a gentleman,
parson & c."). Cf. R. v. Hay, 2 F. & F. 4, 175 Eng. Rep. 933 (Q. B. 1860)
(impliedly admitted the privilege of priest-penitent to exist, but still
cited a priest for contempt for failure to disclose name of person from
whom he had received a stolen watch); Garnet's Trial, 2 How. St. Tr.
218 (1606) (where a priest was not required to disclose any confiden-
tial communications made to im by confession). Contra, R. v. Griffin,
6 Cox Crim. Cas. 219 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1853) (privilege allowed to com-
munications made to the chaplain of a workhouse who visited the de-
fendant as spiritual advisor).
2. Broad v. Pitt, supra note 1 (although failing to recognize the
privilege, Best, C. M., indicated, "I, for one, will never compel a clergy-
man to disclose communications, made to him by a prisoner; but if he
chooses to disclose them I shall receive them in evidence."); Garnet's
Trial, supra note 1 (by implication)
3. 8 WIGMOR, EVWENCPI § 2394 (3d ed. 1940).
4. Garnet's Trial, supra note 1.
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tion to any privilege which might have then existed. In the
words of Sir Edward Coke, ... [B]y the common law, a man
indicted of high treason could not have the benefit of clergy
... nor any clergymen privilege of confession to conceal high
treason .... -5 Thus, it seems that Lord Coke recognized the
existence of the privilege prior to the Reformation except
in cases of high treason. But, it is generally conceded that
the privilege did not exist at common law after the Restora-
tion.6
Accordingly, the privilege has not been included in the
common law of most American jurisdictions. 7 The majority
of the jurisdictions, however, have abrogated the common
law by statute, granting a privilege to such communications. 8
The terminology of the statutes varies somewhat and each
state statute must be examined individually to ascertain who
may claim the privilege and under what circumstances it will
be allowed. 9 The courts have a tendency to construe the stat-
utes very strictly and require that the terms of the statute be
met exactly before the privilege can be invoked.' 0
II. THE PRIVILEGE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The privilege under discussion has caused less difficulty in
the federal courts since it has been recognized by the United
States Supreme Court for some time," however, the recog-
nition has been only incidental and in conjunction with the
other traditional privileges that existed at common law.'
2
5. 2 CoxE, INSTITUTES 629, as quoted in 2 BEST, EVIDENCE § 584
(Morgan ed. 1881).
6. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2394 (3d ed. 1940); 5 JONES, EVIDENCE
§ 2181 (2d ed. 1926); 2 BEST, EVIDENCE] § 584 (Morgan ed. 1881).
7. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 557, 221 S. W. 2d 87 (1949);
State v. Morehous, 97. N. J. L. 285, 117 Atl. 296 (1922); Bahrey v.
Poniatishin, 95 N. J. L. 128, 112 Atl. 481 (1920).
8. See 45 VA. L. RLT. 599, n. 4 for a current compilation of the ex-
isting statutes in the individual states.
9. A typical statute would read, "A clergyman, priest, or religious
practitioner of an established church cannot, without the consent of the
person making the confession, be examined as to any confession made
to him in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined
by the church to which he belongs." CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1881 (Deer-
ing 1959).
10. Johnson v. Commonweulth, supra note 7; In re Koellen's Estate,
162 Kan. 395, 176 P. 2d 544 (1947); State v. Brown, 95 Ia. 381, 64
N. W. 277 (1895). But see, Boyles v. Cora, 232 Ia. 882, 6 N. W. 2d
401 (1942) (dictum); In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N. W. 589
(1931).
11. Totten v. U. S., 92 U. S. 105 (1876) (dictum).
12. U. S. v. Keeney, 111 F. Supp. 233 (D. D. C. 1953) (dictum),
rev'd on other grounds 218 F. 2d 843 (D. C. Cir. 1954); McMann v.
S. E. C., 87 F. 2d 377 (2d Cir. 1937) (dictum) cert. denied Mle ann
v. Engle, 301 U. S. 684 (1937); Totten v. U. S., supra note 11 (dictum).
2
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Professor Moore indicates that privileged communications
are controlled principally by the state statutes, which, under
Rule 43 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, will
clearly govern in the absence of any contrary federal statutes
or rules of court.' 3 The effect of Rule 43 (a) is to favor the
admissibility of evidence, if possible,"4 and it might be argued
that in the absence of any express statutory or judicial utter-
ance by the State, the common law rule denying the privilege
would apply, and under Rule 43 (a), the evidence would be
admitted.'5 This reasoning probably would be rejected by the
federal courts because the exclusion of the privileged com-
munication in civil suits is favored by the federal courts, not-
withstanding the language of Rule 43 (a).16 It would seem,
however, that given a judicial decision of a state court de-
nying the privilege, the district courts sitting in that state
would be bound to follow the state common law and admit
the communication in evidence. 17 Conversely, if there is a
state statute granting a privilege to confidential communi-
cations between clergymen and penitents, the district court
would be bound to exclude such evidence in accordance with
the state statute.'8
On the other hand, in federal criminal actions, the federal
courts will exclude the testimony as privileged only if the
13. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 43.07 (2d ed. 1951).
14. FED. R. CIv. P. 43(a), "All evidence shall be admitted which is
admissible under the statutes of the United States, or under the rules
of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on
the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied
in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United
States court is held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors the
reception of the evidence governs and the evidence shall be presented
according to the most convenient method prescribed in any of the stat-
utes or rules to which reference is herein made. The competency of a
witness to testify shall be determined in like manner."
15. GREEN, Admissibility of Evidence under the Federal Rules, 55
HARV. L. R. 197 at 222, "Rule 43(a) is founded on the assumption that
when a choice may be made between two rules, the one which will ad-
mit the evidence should always be chosen. Taken as a general principle
this assumption is sound, but like many another broad principle it is
not universally correct. Sometimes the rule excluding the evidence
should be chosen." See also, Mullen v. U. S., 263 F. 2d 275 (D. C. Cir.
1959).
16. Compa'e Mullen v. U. S., supra note 15, with U. S. v. Brunner,
200 F. 2d 276 (6th Cir. 1952).
17. 5 MOoRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 43.04 at 1326 n. 20 (2d ed. 1951),
"It is clear, therefore, that state common law is applicable under Rule
43(a) if it favors the reception of the proposed testimony." Cf. note 15
supra.
18. Id. at § 43.07. Privileged communications ".. are controlled prin-
cipally by state statutes, which under Rule 43(a) will clearly govern,
if no federal statues or rules of court contrary to the state statutes are
enacted or promulgated .. 2" But see, U. S. v. Brunner, supra note 16;
see note 33 infre:
3
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privilege is recognized under the common law as interpreted
"in the light of reasoning and experience."' 9 Thus, a literal
interpretation of Criminal Rule 26 would lead to the conclu-
sion that the priest-penitent privilege would not be recog-
nized in federal criminal actions because of the non-recogni-
tion of the privilege under the common law,20 unless the privi-
lege could be sustained in the light of reason and experience.
2 '
The privilege, however, has been allowed in one federal crimi-
nal prosecution on that basis.
22
Criminal Rule 26 is to be contrasted with Civil Rule 43 (a).
The latter rule results in the application of state law by the
district courts in civil suits, where state substantive law
should govern the rights of the parties.23 Although the appli-
cation of state law in civil suits results in a lack of uni-
formity in the rules of evidence used by federal courts and,
in particular, those pertaining to privileged communications,
this divergency of application of evidence rules is not neces-
sarily bad or unjust.
24
By contrast, uniform application of rules of evidence in
federal courts appears to be desirable, if not essential, in
criminal cases, since all federal crimes are statutory and all
criminal prosecutions in federal courts are based on acts of
Congress. 25 To rule otherwise would result in some defendants
being acquitted and others being convicted under the same
facts merely because they were fortunate or unfortunate
enough to be tried in a particular district court.
In a recent federal decision 26 the court was squarely con-
fronted with the admission into testimony of a communica-
tion that should have been excluded because privileged, but
the court reversed on other grounds. 27 The defendant had been
19. FED. R. CRrm. P. 26, "The admissibility of evidence and the com-
petency and privileges of the witnesses shall be governed, except -when
an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience." See Mullen v. U. S., 263
F. 2d 275 (D. C. Cir. 1959); Brunner v. U. S., 168 F. 2d 281 (6th Cir.
1948) (by analogy).
20. See note 1 supra.
21. See note 19 supra.
22. Mullen v. U. S., supra note 19 (priest-penitent privilege recog-
nized in a criminal prosecution in spite of its non-existence under the
common law).
2a. See note 17, 18 supra.
24. 18 U. S. C. A. 255, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules.
25. Ibid.
26. Mullen v. U. S., 263 F. 2d 275 (D. C. Cir. 1959).
27. The charge to the jury concerning the violation of the criminal
statute was held to be erroneous and was reversed without consider-
ation of the other alleged errors.
4
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indicted under a federal statute28 for mistreating her children
by chaining them in her house while she was absent. The dis-
trict court allowed a Lutheran minister to testify that the
defendant had made certain statements to him as a penitent
in preparation for receiving communion as a Lutheran com-
municant. Judge Fahy, in giving an additional ground for
reversal in a special concurring opinion, maintained that,
notwithstanding the lack of objection by the defendant's
counsel and the absence of a federal statute granting the
privilege, the testimony of the minister should have been
excluded because it had been made to the clergyman in his
professional capacity. The clergyman was bound to silence by
the discipline and laws of the Lutheran Church. By way of
dictum, he intimated that the privilege should have been al-
lowed even if it had not been a criminal action.
After an enlightening discussion of the history of the privi-
lege at common law, Judge Fahy concluded: "Sound policy
- reason and experience - concedes to religious liberty a
rule of evidence that a clergyman shall not disclose on a trial
the secrets of a penitent's confidential confession to him, at
least absent the penitent's consent." Thus, the privilege was
extended to the communication between clergyman and peni-
tent in the absence of any legislation by Congress and in
spite of the non-existence of the privilege at common law.2 9
Judge Edgerton, concurring with Judge Fahy's opinion
above, indicated in a separate opinion also that he would ex-
tend the privilege further. He would not limit exclusion of the
testimony to the traditional privileges, however disputed
they might be, but would include almost any confidential com-
munication made:
I think a communication made in reasonable confidence
that it will not be disclosed, and in such circumstances
that disclosure is shocking to the moral sense of the com-
munity, should not be disclosed in a judicial proceeding,
whether the trusted person is or is not a wife, husband,
doctor, lawyer, or minister. 30
Whether such a broad application of the concept of privi-
lege should be carried to the extent proposed by Judge Edger-
ton is open to serious doubt, even in criminal cases, although
28. D. C. CODM § 22-901 (1951), which makes it a criminal offense
to "torture, cruelly beat, 'abuse, or otherwise wilfully mistreat any
child.. .."
29. Mullen v. U. S., supra note 26 at 280.
30. Mullen v. U. S., supra note 26 at 281.
[Vol. 12
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it is quite true that there are some confidential relationships
outside of the traditional ones which result in delicate and
difficult situations when the privilege is excluded and the
testimony required. Any privilege of non-disclosure is bound
to exclude evidence in a judicial proceeding which may be
sorely needed, and in some cases may lead the court to erro-
neous results. The traditional privileges, including the priest-
penitent privilege, are based upon public policy and involve a
balancing of the interest of the private individual in protec-
tion of his most private and intimate communications against
the necessity of the exposure of such communications for the
public good and the administration of justice.
While the rules of evidence in federal criminal prosecutions
look to the common law to determine admissibility, the princi-
ples gleaned therefrom have to be interpreted in the light of
reason and experience. 31 Accordingly, the confidential commu-
nication between clergyman and penitent is recognized to be in
the same category as the other traditional privileges which
existed at common law.32 There seems to be some doubt sur-
rounding the admissibility of privileged communications in
federal courts in civil actions where the court is not bound
to look at the state law,33 but it is likely that the priest-peni-
tent privilege will attach in such a case only if it would shock
the community's sense of ethics to require disclosure of a con-
fidential communication made to a priest in his professional
capacity.
33a
III. PRIVILEGE IN THE STATE COURTS
Unlike the federal courts, the judiciary of the states have
been reluctant to allow the privilege in the absence of a stat-
ute specifically granting it because such a privilege did not
exist at common law.34 Most states have granted by statute a
privilege to communications between clergymen and peni-
31. See note 19 supra.
32. Mullen v. U. S., 263 F. 2d 275 (D. 0. Cir. 1959).
33. U. S. v. Brunner, 200 F. 2d 276 (6th Cir. 1952) (testimony of wife
was allowed against her husband in a civil action).
33a. Mullen v. U. S., supra note 32 (by implication); U. S. v. Brun-
ner upra note 33, (by analogy).
34. State v. Morehous, 97 N. J. L. 285, 117 Atl. 296 (1922) (statement
made to major in the Salvation Army was not privileged, even assum-
ing -that he was a clergyman, in the absence of a statute); Bahrey v.
Poniatishin, 95 N. J. L. 128, 112 Atl. 481 (1920) (witness was allowed
to disclose communication made to her by the priest who wa defend-
ant in a slander suit; no statute granting the privilege). Compure
People v. Phillips, 1 West L. J. 109 (N. Y. 1820), vith Christian Smith's
Trial, 1 Amer. St. Tr. 779 (N. Y. 1817) as discussed in 8 WIGuoRE,
EVIDENCE § 2394 n. 7 (3d ed. 1940).
19601
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tents.35 However, the statutes are strictly construed by the
courts and the communication must meet exactly the terms of
the statute before the privilege will be allowed.3 6 Though
the courts have not clearly stated their reasons, the narrow
construction by the courts is probably based on the supposi-
tion that such a statute is in derogation of the common law
and therefore to be strictly construed.
The statutes usually require that the communication be
made to the clergyman in his professional capacity and in
the course of discipline enjoined by the church or denomina-
tion of the minister.3 7 The mere fact that the communication
was made to a clergyman in confidence is not sufficient, as
it is required to be penitential in character or in pursuance
of the discipline of the church.3 8 All faiths are included in
the privilege if the person taking the penitence is a recog-
nized minister of a particular faith, or takes a confession ac-
cording to the discipline enjoined by that church.39 Either
the declarant or the minister should be allowed to claim the
privilege, 39, and the failure to object to the admission of a
privileged communication should not render the testimony
35. See note 8 supra.
36. See note 10 supra.
37. The following cases excluded testimony by a clergyman as being
privileged: Cook v. Carroll, Ir. R. 515 (1945) (no statute granting the
privilege) ; In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N. W. 589 (1931) ; Dehler
v. State, 22 Ind. App. 383, 53 N. E. 850 (1899). The following cases
allowed the clergyman to testify: Johnson v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky.
557, 221 S. W. 2d 87 (1949); Christensen v. Pestorious, 189 Blinn. 548,
25 N. W. 363 (1933); State v. Brown, 95 Ia. 381, 64 N. W. 277 (1895).
But See, UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 29(c) which requires a "confes-
sion of culpable conduct" before the communication can be penitential.
38. Sherman v. State, 170 Ark. 148, 279 S. W. 353 (1926) (a close
decision indicating a very strict construction of the statute); State v.
Morgan, 196 Mo. 177, 95 S. W. 402 (1906); Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201
(1881) ; Gillooley v. State, 58 Ind. 182 (1877). See also UNIFORM RULE OF
EVIDENCE 29(c) and A. L. I. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 219(c)
(1942) ..... '[P]enitential communication' means a confession of culp-
able conduct made secretly and in confidence by a penitent to a priest
in the course of the discipline or practice of the church ... of which the
penitent is a member." (Emphasis added.)
39. Johnson v. Commonwealth, supra note 37 (Methodist); Reutke-
meier v. Nolte, 179 Ia. 342, 161 N. W. 290 (1917) (Presbyterian);
Dehler v. State, supra note 37 (Catholic); Knight v. Lee, supra note
38 (Christian). Other cases ignore denominational connection: Chris-
tensen v. Pestorious, supra note 37; Sherman v. State, supra note 38;
Alford v. Johnson, 103 Ark. 236, 146 S. W. 516 (1912); State v. Brown,
supra note 37.
39a. See Cook v. Carroll, Ir. R. 515 (1945) as discussed in 6 LOYOLA
L. Rnv. 1 (1951) and 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2396 (Supp. 1957); West-
over v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 99 N. Y. 56, 1 N. E. 104 (1885) (dictum).
See also note 55a infra; Final Draft of The Rules of Evidence, Notes
on R. 29 (Utah 1959).
7
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any more admissible than without the objection.40 Whether
the declarant is a member of the same church as the minister
or not, does not appear to limit the privilege;41 but the courts
may have a tendency to find that the communication was
not made to the minister acting in his professional capacity
when the confessor is not a member of the minister's church.
Exactly what weight the courts place on membership cannot
be determined from the cases, but it seems to be a factor con-
sidered in conjunction with the other circumstances surround-
ing a communication. 42 Voluntary statements made to other
members of the same congregation are not privileged,43 but
if the communication is made to other officers of the church,
acting in an official capacity, the communication is privi-
leged. 44 Clergymen are usually allowed to testify as to their
opinion of a person's state of mind, or to their opinion of the
person's intention, or to a person's mental competence, 45 and,
40. The statutes generally require a waiver by the declarant, as in
Act No. 196 of Acts and Joint Resolutions, 51 STAT. 344 (S. C. 1959).
But see Cook v. Carroll, supra (privilege is lodged in the priest ex-
clusively and the parishioner should not have been allowed to testify
without his consent). Contra, Bahrey v. Poniatishin, 95 N. J. L. 128,
112 Atl. 481 (1920) (no statute granting the privilege).
41. In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N. W. 589 (1931) (penitent not
a member of the clergyman's church, nor a member of any church, still
the communication was held to be privileged); Reutkemeier, 179 Ia.
342, 161 N. W. 290 (1917) (member, testimony excluded); Dehler v.
State, 22 Ind. App. 383, 53 N. E. 850 (1899) (member, testimony ex-
cluded). Contra, UNIFORM RULE OF EviDENCE 29(b), " '[Penitent'
means a member of a church or religious denomination or organization
who has made a penitential communication to a priest thereof .. .
(Emphasis added.) UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 29(c) states that "..
'penitential communication' means a confession of culpable conduct
made secretly and in confidence by a penitent to a priest in the course
of discipline or practice of the church . . . of which the penitent is a
member." (Emphasis added.) Accord, A. L. I. MODEL CODE OF EViDENCE
Rule 219(c) (1942).
42. In re Koellen's Estate, 162 Kan. 395, 176 P. 2d 544 (1947) (mem-
ber, testimony allowed). Cf., State v. Morgan, 196 Mo. 177, 95 S. W.
402 (1906) (not member, testimony allowed); State v. Brown, 95 Ia.
381, 64 N. W. 277 (1895) (not member, testimony allowed). See also
UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 29.
43. Milburn v. Haworth, 47 Colo. 593, 108 Pac. 155 (1910) (state-
ments made by the defendant in the presence of other members of
his church, including the minister, were held not to be privileged);
Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. 161 (1818) (voluntary statements
to other church members confessing a crime was held admissible in
the absence of a statute granting the privilege).
44. Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Ia. 342, 161 N. W. 290 (1917) (on re-
quest a young girl appeared before the church session consisting of the
pastor and three ruling elders, held that the statements were privileged
communications). Contra, Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201 (1881).
45. Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121 Ind. App. 262, 95 N. E. 2d 304 (1950)
(minister allowed to testify to the soundness of the mind of the grantor
of a deed). But see, Boyles v. Cora, 230 Ia. 822, 6 N. W. 2d 401 (1942)
(by analogy) (a general statute granting a privilege to confidential
communications was held to apply to observations made in a professional
1960]
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on occasion, may qualify as an expert witness to indicate such
observations.46 A court may inquire into the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding and leading up to the communica-
tion to determine if it is privileged, but it cannot compel
disclosure of the communication, for obvious reasons, in or-
der to make the ruling.
47
A real problem is the determination of whether or not the
communication or confession is made to the clergyman in his
professional capacity. The courts have been very strict on
this point and require that the statement be made to the
clergyman in his professional character by a penitent asking
for spiritual aid and comfort. In essence, the determination is
to be made by the trial judge after a consideration of all the
facts and circumstances surrounding the challenged commu-
nication. Therefore, this threshold problem is within the dis-
cretion of the trial judge and he should be' allowed a large
measure of freedom when confronted with the introduction of
testimony which might be privileged. In the final analysis, it is
the duty of the trial court to draw the line of departure and to
determine when a communication ceases to be mere conversa-
tion and assumes the character of a confidential communica-
tion. The judge in the trial court should, out of fairness to the
individual, scrutinize the surrounding facts closely where there
is any question of privilege. The vast majority of the cases
will be clearly privileged or non-privileged, but it is in the
penumbra between these two extremes that care should be
taken to prevent the disclosure of any confidential communi-
cation which the statutes have protected with a privilege.
IV. THE PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
No case has been found in South Carolina, either granting
or denying the privilege to testimony, concerning a communi-
cation made by a penitent to a clergyman. It may be argued
that South Carolina, primarily a common law state, would
have followed the rule under the common law denying the
privilege. This question has been rendered moot by the pas-
sage of a statute in 1959 granting the privilege.
In February, 1959, a bill was introduced in the Senate of
capacity as well as to communications heard in a professional capacity).
Partridge v. Partridge, 220 Mo. 321, 119 S. W. 415 (1909) (priest
allowed to testify to the intention of the grantor of a deed which the
priest had drawn in his capacity as a notary public); Estate of Toomes,
54 Cal. 509 (1880) (priest allowed to testify upon the issue of sanity
of the testatrix in a contested will suit).
46, Estate of Toomes, supra note 45.
47. In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N. W. 589 (1931).
[Vol. 12
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South Carolina providing that no clergyman or confidential
employee of such clergyman should be allowed to testify in
any of the courts of this state concerning any communica-
tion made to the clergyman in his professional capacity.
48
The bill passed the Senate with very little, if any, debate49
and was sent to the House of Representatives. 0 The House
substantially amended the bill by completely rewriting the
first section.51 The bill was then returned to the Senate which
accepted the amendment in toto and, as amended, passed the
present statute which became effective May 18, 1959 upon
the approval of the Governor. 52
The original bill, as introduced by the Senate, was both
narrowed and expanded by the amendment attached by the
House of Representatives. 53 The original bill extended the
privilege to the confidential secretaries and employees of the
clergymen as well as to the broad general classification of
ministers of the gospel and priests. There was no require-
ment that the clergymen be ordained and the construction
of the statute as to who would be a "minister of the gospel"
was left to the courts. It also stated that the minister "would
not be allowed," in giving testimony, to disclose any confiden-
tial communication properly entrusted to him in his profes-
sional capacity. Thus, the burden of excluding the testimony
48. Senate Bills § 8-1215 (1959). "In the courts of this State, no min-
ister of the gospel or priest of any denomination, or the stenographer
or confidential clerk of any such minister or priest who obtains such
information by reason of his employment, shall be allowed, in giving
testimony, to disclose any confidential communication properly en-
trusted to him in his professional capacity, and necessary -and proper
to enable him to discharge the functions of his office according to the
usual course of practice or discipline of his church. This prohibition
shall not apply to cases where the party in whose favor the same is
made waives the rights conferred." Cf., UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE
29. It is interesting to compare the changes in the Uniform Rules pro-
posed by the New Jersey Commission on Evidence, N. J. Commission
on Evidence, Report (1956).
49. Journal of the Senate, 404 (1959).
50. House Journal, South Carolina Regular Session, 489 (1959).
51. House Journal, South Carolina Regular Session, 1324 (1959).
52. Journal of the Senate, 1354 (1959); House Journal, South Caro-
lina Regular Session, 1614 (1959); Act No. 196 of Acts and Joint
Resolutions, 51 STAT. 344 (S. C. 1959), "In any legal or quasi-legal
trial, hearing or proceeding before any court, commission or committee
no regular or duly ordained minister, priest or rabbi shall be required,
in giving testimony, to disclose -any confidential communication properly
entrusted to him in his professional capacity and necessary and proper
to the usual course of practice or discipline of his church or religious
body. This prohibition shall not apply to cases where the party in whose
favor the same is made waives the rights conferred." Cf., UJNFOR=
RuLE OF EVIDENCE 29 and A. L. I. MODEL CODE OF EvDEN E, R. 219
('privilege is allowed only when confession is made to a minister by
a member of his church).
53. Compare note 48 supra, with note 52 supra.
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clearly was to lie on the trial judge and not on the opponent of
the evidence to object. The privilege specified was allowed
only in the courts of the state and, therefore, was not avail-
able to persons in administrative hearings or similar type
actions. It could be argued that the federal district courts
would not be compelled to recognize the privilege as they
were, by implication, excluded from the terms of the bill. This,
however, does not seem to be a justifiable conclusion from
the reading of the original bill."
4
The amendment, which was subsequently adopted by both
of the legislative houses, makes substantial changes in the
original bill, by extending the privilege to any legal or quasi-
legal trial, hearing, or proceeding before any court, commis-
sion or committee.55 It further provides that the clergyman
"could not be required" to testify to any communications of
confidence, but does not prevent him from testifying if he
should desire to do so. Therefore, a question still remains
as to whether a clergyman may, of his own accord, disclose
a confidential communication made to him, which would
otherwise be privileged.rsa
Both the amendment and the original bill allowed a waiver
by the party in whose favor the privilege is conferred, but
failed to specify if the waiver would have to be express or
could be implied from the circumstances. 56 Neither excluded
testimony of a communicant as to any communication by the
clergyman and this relatively unimportant point may create
a problem.
The statute, as passed, seems to be substantially in accord
with similar statutes of many of the other states.57 The
amendment of the original bill probably strengthens the privi-
lege considerably by extending it to other proceedings than
those within the courts of the state, but it is questionable
whether or not it is proper to exclude the confidential secre-
taries who may overhear or may learn of the confidential com-
munication by virtue of their positions. The superimposed
requirement that the clergyman be an ordained minister,
priest, or rabbi would seem to be a substantial improvement
in the original bill, preventing too broad an interpretation
54. See note 48 supra.
55. See note 52 supra.
55a. See Mullen v. U. S., 263 F. 2d 275 (D. C. Cir. 1959).
56. See note 48, 52 supra. See also, Mullen v. U. S., supra note 55a
(fact that minister testified as a character witness did not waive the
privilege).
57. See note 8, 9 supra.
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of those persons who might be construed to be clergymen. 8
It would avoid abuse by persons who might claim to be "spirit-
ual advisors."
The amended bill is well drafted and upon application of
the statute to factual situations few problems of interpre-
tation should arise. This is not to say that there will be
no problems for the courts to resolve. For example, just
when is a clergyman acting in his professional capacity
pursuant to the functions of his office and according to the
usual course of practice or discipline of his church? The vast
majority of communications will be either clearly within or
without the scope of the privilege, but, upon occasion, a close
question may present itself.5 9 It is within the discretion of
the trial judge to allow or exclude the testimony, and the deci-
sion can be made from an inquiry into the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the communication without an actual dis-
closure of the questioned communication.60
The basis for the privilege, as indicated by the decisions,
is generally rested upon public policy.6' Accordingly, the court
should give a liberal construction to the statute in order to
effectuate the broad general intention of the legislature. It
is peculiar to note that, although the statute is stated to be
based upon public policy, other state courts have consistently
required strict compliance to the terms of the statute.62 It is
hoped that such will not be the case in South Carolina, and
that the courts will broadly construe the statute in order
to preserve the privilege of confidential communications to
bona fide clergymen by persons seeking spiritual aid and
guidance. The need for such evidence in any one case does
not override the need of the general public to be secure in
their intimate communications to men of the church. While
there are relatively few cases on the point, the mere fact
that the privilege has been granted by legislation in the ma-
jority of the states would seem, in itself, to indicate the
58. See note 48, 52 supra.
59. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 557, 221 S. W. 2d 87 (1949);
In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N. W. 589 (1931). But see, Sherman
v. State, 170 Ark. 148, 279 S. W. 353 (1926); Alford v. Johnson, 103
Ark. 236, 146 S. W. 516 (1912) ; State v. Brown, 95 Ia. 381, 64 N. W.
277 (1895).
60. In re Swenson, supra note 59.
61. In re Swenson, zupra note 59; Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Ia. 342,
161 N. W. 290 (1917).
62. See note 10 supra.
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overwhelming approval of the privilege in this country
today.0 3
V. REASONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE PRIVILEGE
Most of the opinions by the various courts which have had
an opportunity to discuss a ruling made in accordance with
a priest-penitent statute have founded their results upon the
exigencies of public policy.64 This often-used, catch-all term
does not alone provide a sufficient reason for the existence
or creation of the privilege. It is merely a nebulous means
of justifying an end-result. Professor Wigmore has ahalyzed
the underlying reasons in terms of why any privilege existed
at common law. He indicates that there are four basic con-
ditions by which the existence of any privilege is governed.
These are:06
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence
that they will not be disclosed;
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to
the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation be-
tween the parties;
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered; and
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communication must be greater than
the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposition of
litigation. (All italics in original.)
All of the conditions must be present before a privilege
should be recognized, and, absent the satisfaction of any one,
the communication will be removed from its preferred position
in the eyes of the law. It would seem, considering the above
conditions, that the priest-penitent privilege would have ex-
isted under the common law along with the other traditional
privileges. This does not appear to be true, although it may be
debated whether or not the privilege was recognized under
the common law. It is likely that the non-recognition of the
privilege was caused by the implied failure to satisfy the
third condition stated above.00
Even so, there is no reason for the various American
63. See note 8 supra; UNIFORM RULE OF EvIDEN E 29; A. L. I. MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE, R. 219.
64. See, e.g., In re Swenson, supra note 59.
65. 8 WIGMTORE, EviDENcE § 2285 at 531 (3d ed. 1940).
66. Id. at 532.
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jurisdictions blindly to follow the common law rule,67 substi-
tuting it for their own reasoning and experience where its
value cannot be sustained on the merits of the rule.68 The
benefit to be derived from protecting this confidential com-
municatilon would seem much greater than the possible benefit
accruing to litigants by allowing exposure. A person would
hardly be likely to make the necessary soul-cleansing admis-
sion of guilt necessary, in many cases, for spiritual rehabili-
tation if he realizes that the communications might later be
used against him. It is common knowledge that such con-
fessions or confidential communications are recognized by
many churches and religious groups as necessary for the
rehabilitation of those persons who have violated the princi-
ples of the church. Participation is not only encouraged, but
in the doctrines of some of the churches, it is required. The
court should take judicial notice that the discipline of non-
disclosure is traditionally enjoined upon all clergymen by
the doctrines of their respective churches when such is the
case.0 9 It is difficult, indeed, to understand how the privi-
lege allowing a penitent uninhibited disclosure to his spiritual
advisor could be denied in this country with its established
principles of freedom of religion and its atmosphere of re-
ligious tolerance in all areas. The problem has been allevi-
ated in South Carolina by the passage of the statute discussed
above, and it is hoped that the courts will interpret the statute
in a manner in keeping with the spirit of the protective cloak
that the legislature has attempted to place around such confi-
dential communications.
HERBERT L. MOODY, JR.
67. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. R. 4
at 24 (1936), "In ascertaining whether challenged action is reasonable,
the traditional common-law technique does not rule out but requires
some inquiry into the social and economic data to which it is to be
applied. Whether action is reasonable or not must always depend upon
the particular facts and circumstances in which it is taken. Action
plainly unreasonable at one time and in one set of circumstances may
not be so in other times and conditions."
68. Mullen v. U. S., 263 F. 2d 275 (D. C. Cir. 1959), "When reason
and experience call for recognition of a privilege which has the effect of
restricting evidence the dead hand of the common law will not restrain
such recognition."
69. In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N. W. 589 (1931).
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